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Abstract 
According to agency theory, the interests of shareholders are safeguarded only where 
different people occupying the two positions of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
and the chairman of the board of directors. This implies that CEO duality (i.e. the 
CEO serves also as the board chairman) is negatively associated with corporate 
performance. However, empirical evidence is mixed with respect to this prediction of 
agency theory. This paper aims at re-examining the predictions of agency theory with 
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regard to the negative association between CEO duality and corporate performance 
using the financial statements for the year 2006 of most actively traded companies in 
the Egyptian stock market. It examines the role of other corporate governance 
mechanisms (board size, top managerial ownership and institutional ownership) as 
moderating variables in the relationship between CEO duality and corporate 
performance. Moderated Regression Analysis is used to analyse the empirical data. 
Our findings indicated that the hypothesized relationship between CEO duality, the 
moderating variables (top management ownership, board size and institutional 
ownership) and corporate performance has changed. We found that board size was the 
only moderating variable (a homologizer variable), top management ownership was a 
suppressor variable, and institutional ownership was simply another independent 
variable. For companies characterized by large boards and low top management 
ownership, corporate performance is negatively affected by CEO duality and 
positively impacted by institutional ownership. 
 
Keywords: corporate governance; corporate performance; Egypt; accounting-based 
performance; agency theory; CEO duality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, the Anglo-American system of corporate governance has received 
increasing attention because of a series of shocking financial scandals and corporate 
failures such as Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, Arthur Andersen and others 
(Coles et al., 2001; Eighme and Cashell, 2002; Klein, 2002; Tipgos and Keefe, 2004; 
Agrawal, and Chadha, 2005; Davidson et al., 2005; Parker, 2005; Seal, 2006; 
Balgobin, 2008; Bauer et al., 2008; Omran et al., 2008). These corporate crashes refer 
to the failure of existing corporate governance practices in predicting and preventing 
corporate failures. At the heart of the Anglo-American corporate governance system 
is an agency problem that agents (e.g. managers) will not act to maximise the returns 
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to principals (e.g. shareholders) unless corporate governance mechanisms are 
implemented to narrow the divergence of interests between shareholders and 
managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, the effectiveness of these 
mechanisms depends critically on the ability of the board of directors to detect 
managerial mistakes (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). This body is in place to represent 
and safeguard the interests of shareholders. It monitors and controls managerial 
actions on behalf of shareholders by setting strategic policies and goals.  
 
According to agency theory, the interests of shareholders are safeguarded only where 
different people occupying the two positions of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
and the chairman of the board of directors (Rhoades et al., 2001). This means that 
CEO duality (i.e. the CEO serves also as the board chairman) is negatively associated 
with corporate performance. However, empirical evidence is mixed with respect to 
this prediction of agency theory. Some scholars found that non-executive board chair 
is positively associated with corporate performance (e.g. Berg and Smith, 1978; 
Rechner and Dalton, 1991; Daily and Dalton, 1994). Other scholars found that 
executive-chaired boards are significantly associated with higher corporate 
performance (e.g. Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994; Lin, 
2005). Still others suggest that no significant difference in corporate performance 
between executive and non-executive chaired boards (e.g. Chaganti et al., 1985; Molz, 
1988; Baliga et al., 1996; Abdullah, 2004).      
 
The present paper seeks to re-examine the predictions of agency theory with regard to 
the negative association between CEO duality and corporate performance in the 
context of a developing country, Egypt. It examines other corporate governance 
mechanisms such as board size, top managerial ownership and institutional ownership 
that moderate, and possibly change, the relationship between CEO duality and 
corporate performance. Thus this paper uses Moderated Regression Analysis (MRA) 
as this technique is the most appropriate form of analysis when the relationship 
between dependent and independent variables is conditional on the values assumed by 
other variables (Baron and kenny, 1986; Russell and Babko, 1992; Dunk, 1993; 
Hartmann and Moers, 1999; Smith, 2003). MRA assumes that the effect of one 
independent variable (e.g. CEO duality) on the dependent variable (e.g. corporate 
performance) depends on the level of one or more other independent variables (e.g. 
board size, top management ownership and institutional ownership). In particular, 
Sharma et al.’s (1981) framework for identification and analysis of moderator 
variables will be used.  
 
The empirical data used in this paper is based on the financial statements for the year 
2006 of most actively traded companies in the Egyptian stock market as reported by 
the Egyptian Market Authority. The Egyptian context is particularly important 
because the Anglo-American model of corporate governance is recently adopted in 
Egypt. The Egyptian Institute of Directors, with support from the World Bank, the 
International Finance Corporation and the Ministry of Foreign Trade, has created a 
code, guidelines and standards of corporate governance that are based on the 
corporate governance principles of the Organization of Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). So this study could highlight the effectiveness of the Anglo-
American model of corporate governance in Egypt.    
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The remainder of this paper is organised in five sections. In the next section, we 
describe existing practices and recent developments of CEO governance in Egypt. 
Then, we develop study hypotheses based on agency theory. This is followed by 
details of the research method employed in this study. The paper then analyse the 
empirical data. The final section provides a summary of the paper and some 
conclusions. 
 
2. The CEO Governance in Egypt: Criticisms and Recent Developments 
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund utilise the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) principles of corporate 
governance (i.e. the rights of shareholders, the equitable treatment of shareholders, the 
treatment of stakeholders, disclosure and transparency, and the duties of board 
members) to assess and produce reports on the corporate governance institutional 
frameworks and practices in individual countries (Mallin, 2007). In February 2004, 
they prepare a report that benchmarks the Egyptian corporate governance against the 
OECD principles of corporate governance. The report identified several weaknesses 
in the Egyptian corporate governance practices. This section focuses on describing the 
existing practices and recent improvements in CEO governance rules in Egypt.  
 
2.1 Description of Existing Egyptian CEO Governance Practices      
The existing practices of CEO governance in Egyptian companies are as follows: 
  
1- Board structure and independence 
Egyptian companies have one-tier board structure1. This means that one single board 
comprising executive and non-executive directors. This form of board structure is 
predominant in countries such as the UK, the USA and the majority of EU Member 
States (Mallin, 2007). However, there are no rules that govern the board structure 
from executive or non-executive directors in Egypt. The 2002 listing rules introduced 
the concept of ‘non-executive director’ for the first time but the concept of the 
‘independent board member’ is not clearly applied in Egypt. In most Egyptian 
companies, there is no clear separation between the board of directors and the 
executive management. The board of directors does not include independent 
members, nor does it form ad hoc committees to consider assigned subjects.  
 
2- Chairman and chief executive officer 
In Egypt, the chairman is often also the CEO. The board member responsible for the 
executive management is sometimes called the managing director or the chief 
executive officer. This means that there is CEO duality. The CEO is responsible for 
the running of the board as well as the running of the company’s business. This 
duality exists in some other countries. In Australia, only a small percentage of large 
companies have CEO duality (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). However, about 80 
percent of large US companies have CEOs are also the chairman (Kesner and Dalton, 
1986; Dalton and Kesner, 1987). In fact, the two roles should not be combined and 
carried out by one person, as this would give an individual too much power. 
 
3- Board size and appointments to the board 
                                                 
1 This differs from two-tier board structure that consists of a supervisory board and an executive board 
of directors. The supervisory board oversees the direction of the business whilst the management board 
is responsible for the running of the business (Mallin, 2007). 
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In Egypt, the board of directors consists of an odd number of members, with a 
minimum of three members. Board members must be shareholders or represent the 
participating companies which are shareholders with the exception of two members 
(as a maximum) who are chosen because they are ‘experts in the field’. The annual 
general assembly elects directors on the board for a period of three renewable years, 
sets their remuneration, and can remove them if necessary. Election conditions 
include the ownership of a minimum number of shares as indicated in the company’s 
statutes (with the exception of the two experts). These shares will be kept as 
qualification shares until the expiry of the board’s term and the ratification of the last 
annual financial statements by the annual general assembly. Directors must submit a 
CV, including a list of companies with which they have been associated during the 
previous three years. An employee cannot be appointed before having served at least 
two years with the company. A recent Prime Ministerial decree mandates that 
directors may serve on a maximum of two boards, but CEOs should only serve on one 
board with the exception of directors who owns at least 10 % of the company’s share 
capital. If the company experiences losses, board members cannot be re-appointed.  
 
4- The board meeting and the functions of the board of directors: 
In Egypt, the board holds its meetings at the request of its chairman or two-thirds of 
its members. The board meeting is considered valid if the number of attendees is not 
less than half of its members plus one, provided the number of attendees is not less 
than three board members. However, there is no disclosure of board meeting 
attendance. The board of directors has responsible for supervising the implementation 
of the company’s objectives as decided by its general assembly. The board is 
responsible to the shareholders. The functions of the board of directors include: 
inviting the shareholders to meet, investing the company’s funds, requesting loans, 
appointing executive managers and submitting financial statements and board reports 
to the general assembly meeting. According to the World Bank-IMF report on the 
observance of standards and codes, the boards of most Egyptian companies do not yet 
play a central and strategic role, and their functions are not clearly distinguished from 
those of management. They most often lack independence from controlling 
shareholders and from management. Boards do not have responsibility for monitoring 
governance practices, or for overseeing disclosure and communications, although 
board members are liable for false statements.  
 
2.2 Recent Improvements in CEO Governance Rules 
In October 2005, the Egyptian Institute of Directors, with support from the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Ministry of Foreign Trade, has 
developed a code, guidelines and standards of corporate governance that are based on 
the corporate governance principles of the Organization of Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD). The ‘new’ Egyptian code of corporate governance 
consists of a set of guidelines and standards related to the following:  
1- General assembly, 
2- Board of directors, 
3- Internal audit department, 
4- External auditor, 
5- Audit committee, 
6- Disclosure of social policies, and 
7- Avoiding conflict of interest. 
 
 6
This ‘new’ Egyptian code has introduced a number of improvements in CEO 
governance. For example, the board of directors should include a majority of non-
executive directors and it is preferred that the two posts of the chairman and the CEO 
should not be held by the same person. However, these ‘new’ governance principles 
are neither mandatory nor legally binding. So it is less likely to have a real impact on 
existing corporate governance practices in Egypt. This paper examines the impact of 
these ‘new’ rules of corporate governance on practice.   
 
3. Agency Theory and Hypotheses Development  
In the last decades of the twentieth century, agency theory became the dominant force 
in the theoretical understanding of corporate governance and it still informs research 
on this area (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Phan and Yoshikawa, 2000; Clarke, 2004; McCarthy and Puffer, 2008). Because of 
the separation of finance and management in modern large corporations and the self-
interested utility-maximising individuals, agency theory suggests that there is an 
agency problem between shareholders (principals) and the CEO (agents). The 
relationship between shareholders and the CEO will inevitably problematic as 
managerial actions depart from those required by shareholders to maximise their 
returns and shareholders attempt to prevent their CEO from maximising their utility. 
From this point of view, corporate governance essentially concerns the constraints 
that are applied to minimise the opportunistic behaviours of the CEO and, therefore, 
reduce the agency problem. To align managerial incentives with the interests of 
stockholders, various corporate governance mechanisms can be used to control these 
behaviours. In this paper, we examine the agency problem caused by CEO duality and 
a number of corporate governance mechanisms that minimise this problem, mainly 
top managerial ownership, board size and institutional ownership. We argue that top 
management ownership, board size and institutional ownership have a moderating 
effect in the relationship between CEO duality and corporate performance (see Figure 
1). The following sections develop the study hypotheses based on agency theory.   
 
 
CEO Duality Corporate Performance 
Moderating Variables 
Top Management Ownership   
Board Size 
Institutional Ownership
Figure 1: Moderating Variables in the relationship between CEO Duality and 
Corporate Performance. 
 
 
3.1 CEO Duality and Corporate Performance 
A major corporate governance mechanism that minimises managerial opportunism is 
the board of directors. This body, in theory, is in place to safeguard the interests of the 
company’s shareholders and provides a monitoring of managerial actions on behalf of 
shareholders by setting strategic policies and goals (Mallin, 2007). This protection 
will occur more fully where board chairman is independent of executive management. 
The CEO is primarily responsible for initiation and implementation of strategic 
decisions, while the board has the responsibility for ratifying and monitoring 
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decisions taken by the CEO. An implicit assumption of agency theory is that CEO is 
an inherently opportunistic agent who will capitalise on every chance to maximise 
personal welfare at the expense of shareholders.  
 
Where the CEO is board chairman, the role of the board as an internal monitoring and 
1: CEO duality is not related to corporate performance.  
.2 Interaction of Top Management Ownership and CEO Duality 
which conflict with 
n implication of agency theory is that where CEO duality is retained, shareholder 
2: There is no interaction between top management ownership and CEO duality that 
.3 Interaction of Board Size and CEO Duality 
munication problems and agency 
control mechanism is compromised. Agency theory proposes that when the CEO also 
serves as board chairman, then board monitoring and control are weakened and the 
interests of the shareholders will be sacrificed to a degree in favour of executive 
management, that is, there will be managerial opportunism such as higher levels of 
executive compensation, adoption of ‘poison pills’ and payment of greenmail (Levy, 
1981; Dayton, 1984; Davis, 1991; Rechner and Dalton, 1991; Pi and Timme, 1993; 
Brickley et al., 1994). This suggests a negative relationship between CEO duality and 
firm performance. Hence, we offer the following hypothesis (null form): 
 
H
 
3
 An agency problem exists when the CEO has established goals 
that of shareholders. Such problem is more likely to occur when the CEO has little or 
no financial interest in the outcome of his decisions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983). This is often the norm, as the CEO of many large companies 
is typically not the majority shareholder. Consequently, the CEO is more likely to 
pursue strategies which maximise his personal welfare at the expense of shareholders 
and minimise his personal risk (Boyd, 1995).  
 
A
interests could be safeguarded by aligning the interests of the CEO and the 
shareholders by suitable incentive schemes for the CEO. Such schemes typically 
include plans whereby the CEO obtains shares, perhaps at a reduced price, thus 
aligning financial interests of the CEO with those of shareholders (Morck et al., 
1988). Where there is CEO duality, the presence of top management ownership will 
align the interests of the CEO with shareholders (Barnhart and Rosenstein, 1998). 
Thus based on agency theory predictions, we expect that high top management 
ownership with CEO duality is likely to give rise to high corporate performance, as 
posited below (null form): 
 
H
affects corporate performance. 
 
3
According agency theory, coordination/ com
problems increase as board size becomes larger. Coordination/ coordination problems, 
on the one hand, arise from the fact that it would be more difficult for the company to 
arrange board meetings and for the board to reach a consensus as a board increases in 
size. This suggests that larger boards are less efficient and slower in making their 
decisions. On the other hand, agency problems result from dysfunctional norms of 
behaviour in board meetings. Lpton and Lorsch (1992) suggest that directors on the 
board normally do not criticise the policies of the CEO or hold candid discussions 
about corporate performance.  
 
 8
With larger boards, the cost to any director of not exercising diligence in controlling 
3: There is no interaction between board size and CEO duality that affects corporate 
.4 Interaction of Institutional Ownership and CEO Duality 
hare ownership is widely 
4: There is no interaction between institutional ownership and CEO duality that 
Data Collection Method 
Alexandria Stock Exchanges 
and monitoring the decisions taken by the CEO falls in proportion to the total number 
of directors on the board. Jensen (1993) argues that when a board has more than seven 
or eight directors, the board of directors is less likely to function effectively and are 
easier for the CEO to control. With CEO duality, it becomes clear that the CEO will 
acquire a wider power base and locus of control, thereby leading to a lower level of 
corporate performance (assuming that CEO is an inherently opportunistic agent) 
(Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Bennedsen et 
al., 2007; Cheng, 2008). Hence, we posit that high corporate performance will be 
associated with small board size and CEO duality. This association is consistent with 
the view that both coordination/ communication problems and agency problems 
become more severe as a board grows larger. Based on this logic, we develop the 
following hypothesis (null form):  
 
H
performance.  
 
3
Agency theory argues that in the modern large corporation, s
held, which makes effective coordination among shareholders difficult and expensive, 
making the CEO the de facto policymaker. Thus CEO actions are more likely to 
depart from those required to maximise shareholder returns. In agency theory terms, 
there is an agency problem which is the extent to which returns to shareholders fall 
below what would be if shareholders exercised direct control of the company. The 
CEO has more inside information than shareholders who therefore face a moral 
hazard problem because the value of managerial strategic decisions may be difficult to 
determine fully. In the case of CEO duality, these problems are exaggerated. 
However, these agency problems are minimized when there is ownership 
concentration, especially in the case of institutional investors. Where institutional 
investors are the largest holders of shares in companies, taking into account the voting 
power associated with their shareholdings, their approval or otherwise of strategies of 
the CEO can be critical factors in shaping how a company is managed and run (Chung 
et al., 2002; Mallin, 2002). In addition, institutional investors have more access to 
inside information like the CEO (Burns, 2001; Cross, 2004). Thus they can closely 
control decisions and actions taken by the CEO and limit the power of the CEO, 
especially when CEO and chairman positions are combined (Chaganti and 
Damanpour, 1991). This suggests that high institutional ownership with CEO duality 
is likely to be associated with high corporate performance, as posited below (null 
form):  
 
H
affects corporate performance. 
4. Research Methodology 
 4.1 Sample Selection and 
The annual Disclosure Book issued by Cairo and 
(CASE) was the main source of data. This book identifies the most active listed 
companies in Egypt and contains a complete data on board characteristics, ownership 
structure, corporate performance and other related variables. The sample used in this 
study was based on the 50 most active Egyptian companies in July 2007. These 
companies cover 15 industries. The banks and the other financial institutions were 
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deleted from the sample because of their huge debt structure which is very much 
different from the other firms, leaving 40 firms in the sample. The use of secondary 
data based on the financial statements of the most active Egyptian companies is due to 
data availability and reliability because these are required by law and are issued by the 
Egyptian Capital Market Authority. The most recent year (2006) was selected to 
reflect the impact of recent developments in corporate governance in Egypt on 
corporate performance.    
 
 4.2 Measurement of Dependent, Independent and Moderating Variables 
ance. Previous 
4.3 Independent and Moderating Variables: 
 CEO duality. A dummy variable is 
. Data Analysis and Findings: 
.1 Descriptive Statistics 
escriptive statistics for all dependent and independent 
able 1: Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables  
 N mum Mean Std. Deviation 
 Dependent Variables: Corporate Performance Variables 
The dependent variable in this study is accounting-based perform
studies on corporate governance and corporate performance have used accounting 
measures such as return on assets and return on equity (Muth and Donaldson, 1998; 
Erhardt et al., 2003). The present paper uses return on assets and return on equity to 
measure corporate performance because the former mainly reflect operating results 
and the latter reflect capital structure decisions. Return on assets (ROA) is measured 
by net profit after tax divided by total assets. Regarding return on equity (ROE), it is 
measured by net profit after tax divided by shareholders equity.     
 
 
The main independent variable in this study is
used as a proxy for CEO duality. This variable takes the value of 1, if the CEO also 
served as board chairman and 0 if there are different people occupying the two 
positions of CEO and board chairman. The moderating Variables examined in this 
study are board size, managerial ownership and institutional ownership. The board 
size is measured based on the total number of directors serving on a company’s board. 
Managerial ownership is measured by the proportion of shares owned by top 
management divided by total number of shares. Finally, institutional ownership is 
measured by the ratio between shares owned by institutional investors and total 
number of shares.   
 
5
 
5
Table 1 reports some d
variables. With regards to accounting-based performance, there is wide deviation 
between firms. The minimum and maximum reported returns on assets (ROA) are -
8% and 35.6% respectively. The mean ROA is 10% with a standard deviation of 
0.1003. Return on equity (ROE) appears relatively stronger with a minimum of -
35.5% and a maximum of 94%. While the mean ROE is 21%, the standard deviation 
is 0.222. For 78% of firms in the sample, the same person holds both the CEO and the 
board chairman positions. This figure is close to that reported in previous work. For 
example, CEO duality is 78.7% in Rechner and Dalton (1991), 76% in Donaldson and 
Davis (1991) and 80.94% in Brickley et al. (1997). This suggests that avenue for 
agency problems emanating from conflict of interest are exaggerated.    
 
T
Descriptive Statistics 
Minimum Maxi
Return on Assets 08 40 -0.0813 0.3555 0.1010 0.1002988 
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Return on Equity 40 -0.3554 0.9397 0.209575 0.2218939 
CEO Duality 40 0 1 0.78 0.423 
Top Management 000 627 593 256 Ownership 40 0.0 0.6 0.065 0.1547
Board Size 40 5 24 11.00 4.231 
Institutional Ownership 034 75 93 503 40 0.0 0.91 0.4745 0.3037
Valid N (listwise) 40     
 
In most of the firms in the sample, top management appears not to have significant 
.2 Moderated Regression Results  
mework for identifying and analysing moderating 
) Y = a + b1 X1 
 b2 X2 
 b3 X1 X2 
 equations 2 and 3 are not significantly different (i.e. b3 = 0; b2 ≠ 0), X2 is not a 
ownership with a mean of 6.6% and a standard deviation of 0.155. While the 
maximum top management ownership is 66.3%, the minimum top management 
ownership is 0%. As previously suggested, top management ownership is important 
as it may be a mechanism that aligns the divergence in interests with shareholders 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Of the firms in the sample, the mean board size is 11 
members with a standard deviation of 4.231. The minimum board size is 5 members 
and the maximum board size is 24 members. This suggests that firms in Egypt have 
relatively large board sizes. This is not good for corporate performance according to 
researchers such as Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) who argue that large 
board sizes are less effective for corporate performance. Finally, the mean 
institutional ownership is 47.5% with a standard deviation of 0.304. The minimum 
institutional ownership is 0.34% and the maximum institutional ownership is 92%. 
This implies that institutional investors in Egypt might have a significant impact on 
corporate performance as expected by researchers such as Salancik and Pfeffer (1980) 
and Chaganti and Damanpour (1991).   
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Sharma et al. (1981) proposed a fra
variables, as depicted in Figure 2. According to this framework, MRA is applied by 
examining three regression equations for equality of the regression coefficients. For 
example, if we assumed three variables; Y (dependent variable), X1 (independent 
variable) and X2 (moderator variable).  
 
(1
(2) Y = a + b1 X1 +
(3) Y = a + b1 X1 + b2 X2 +
 
If
moderator variable but simply an independent variable. For X2 to be classified as a 
pure moderator variable, equations 1 and 2 should not be different but should be 
different from equation 3 (i.e. b2 = 0; b3 ≠ 0). For X2 to be a quasi moderator, 
equations 1, 2 and 3 should be different from each other (i.e. b2 ≠ b3 ≠ 0). The 
following sections use this framework to test research hypotheses.   
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Figure (2): Framework for Indentifying and Analysing Moderator Variables 
Source: Adapted from Sharma et al. (1981: 297) 
 
5.2.1 Hypothesis 1  
To test the first hypothesis, a simple regression analysis was used to analyse the 
hypothetical negative relationship between CEO duality and corporate performance. 
The results, presented in Table 2, indicated that CEO duality significantly and 
negatively affected corporate performance as measured by ROE (p-value = 0.086)2 
but this relationship is not statistically significant when using ROA as a measure of 
corporate performance (p-value = 0.149). This gives us mixed evidence. These results 
are not uncommon in other research on CEO duality and corporate performance (e.g. 
Daily and Dalton, 1992; Brickley et al., 1997). This issue might be resolved when 
considering the moderating effect of other corporate governance variables.    
 
Table 2: The Results of the First Hypothesis Test 
Dependent variable: ROA 
 Coefficient Value S.D. t-statistics p-value 
Constant  
CEO Duality 
A 
b1 
0.144 
-0.055 
0.033 
0.037 
4.361 
-1.471 
0.000 
0.149 
R Square = 0.054; Adjusted R Square = 0.029; F(1, 38) = 2.165; P-value = 0.49 
Dependent variable: ROE 
 Coefficient Value S.D. t-statistics p-value 
Constant 
CEO Duality 
A 
b1 
0.321 
-0.144 
0.072 
0.082 
4.460 
-1.762 
0.000 
0.086 
R Square = 0.076; Adjusted R Square = 0.051; F(1, 38) = 3.106; P-value = 0.086  
                                                 
2 A moderate significant relationship at the 0.10 level. 
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5.2.2 Hypothesis 2  
We also hypothesised that corporate performance may be influenced by the 
interaction of top management ownership and CEO duality. Test results (Table 3) 
indicated no significant interaction between top management ownership and CEO 
duality relative to ROA (p-value = 0.786) and ROE (p-value = 0.894). By examining 
the correlation between CEO duality, top management ownership, ROA and ROE 
(Table 4), it became clear that top management ownership was neither a moderator 
variable nor another independent variable as it had a significant negative correlation 
with CEO duality (the main independent variable). This suggested that top 
management ownership might be an antecedent, extraneous, intervening or suppressor 
variable (Rosenberg, 1968). Additional analyses were performed to identify the role 
played by top management ownership in the relationship between CEO duality and 
corporate performance.  
 
Table 3: The Results of testing the interaction between CEO duality and top 
management ownership 
Dependent variable: ROA 
 Coefficient Value S.D. t-statistics p-value 
Constant  
CEO Duality 
Management Ownership 
CEO duality * 
management Ownership 
A 
b1 
b2 
b3 
0.162 
-0.069 
-0.086 
-0.087 
0.043 
0.048 
 0.132 
0.319 
3.724 
-1.448 
-0.649 
-0.273 
0.001 
0.156 
0.520 
0.786 
R Square = 0.074 ; Adjusted R Square = -0.003; F(3, 36) = 0.957; p-value = 0.423 
Dependent variable: ROE 
 Coefficient Value S.D. t-statistics p-value 
Constant  
CEO Duality 
Management Ownership 
CEO duality * 
management Ownership 
A 
b1 
b2 
b3 
0.358 
-0.174 
-0.176 
-0.094 
0.095 
0.04 
0.290 
0.700 
3.761 
-1.674 
-0.607 
-0.134 
0.001 
0.103 
0.548 
0.894 
R Square = 0.089 ; Adjusted R Square =  0.014; F(3, 36) = 1.178; p-value) = 0.332 
 
Table 4: The correlation between CEO duality, managerial ownership, ROA and ROE 
Correlations 
  
Return on 
Assets 
Return on 
Equity 
CEO 
Duality 
Top 
Management 
Ownership 
Pearson Correlation 1 0.805** -0.232 0.001
Sig. (2-tailed) . 0.000 0.149 0.995
Return on 
Assets 
N 40 40 40 40
Pearson Correlation 0.805** 1 -0.275 0.039
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 . 0.086 0.813
Return on 
Equity 
N 40 40 40 40
Pearson Correlation -0.232 -0.275 1 -0.504**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.149 0.086 . 0.001
CEO Duality 
N 40 40 40 40
Pearson Correlation 0.001 0.039 -0.504** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.995 0.813 0.001 . 
Top 
Management 
Ownership 
N 40 40 40 40
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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First, we hypothesised that top management ownership may be an intervening 
variable which comes between the independent variable (CEO duality) and the 
dependent variable (corporate performance). Three conditions should be met: 
 
1- CEO duality predicts corporate performance. 
2- CEO duality predicts top management ownership.  
3- Top management ownership predicts corporate performance.  
 
From Table 2 above, the first condition was partially met. The relationship between 
CEO duality and corporate performance was moderately significant when corporate 
performance was measured by ROE but was insignificant when using ROA as a 
measure of corporate performance. With regard to the second condition, Table 5 
showed a significant negative association between CEO duality and top management 
ownership (p-value = 0.001). The third condition was not met as the results of 
analysis presented in Table 6 were not significant at conventional significant levels. 
Thus top management ownership failed to be an intervening variable.      
 
Table 5: The Results of Testing the Second Condition 
Dependent variable: Top Management Ownership 
 Coefficient Value S.D. t-statistics p-value 
Constant  
CEO Duality 
A 
B1 
0.209 
-0.185 
0.045 
0.051 
4.624 
-3.601 
0.000 
0.001 
R Square = 0.254; Adjusted R Square = 0.235; F(1, 38) = 12.968; P-value = 0.001 
 
Table 6: The Results of Testing the Third Condition 
Dependent variable: ROA 
 Coefficient Value S.D. t-statistics p-value 
Constant  
Management Ownership 
CEO Duality 
A 
b1 
b2 
0.165 
-0.101 
-0.074 
0.041 
0.119 
0.044 
3.985 
-0.849 
-1.694 
0.000 
0.401 
0.099 
R Square = 0.072; Adjusted R Square = 0.022; F(2, 37) = 1.435; p-value = 0.251 
Dependent variable: ROE 
 Coefficient Value S.D. t-statistics p-value 
Constant  
Management Ownership 
CEO Duality 
A 
b1 
b2 
0.361 
-0.192 
-0.180 
0.091 
0.261 
0.095 
3.990 
-0.738 
-1.885 
0.000 
0.465 
0.067 
R Square = 0.089; Adjusted R Square = 0.040; F(2, 37) = 1.807; p-value = 0.178 
 
Next, we hypothesised that top management ownership may be an antecedent 
variable. It comes before the independent variable (i.e. the CEO duality) in the 
sequence. According to Rosenberg (1968), the antecedent variable does not explain 
away the relationship between the independent and dependent variables but clarifies 
the influences which preceded this relationship. Three conditions should be met: 
 
1- All three variables – antecedent, independent, and dependent – must be related.  
2- When the antecedent variable is controlled, the relationship between the 
independent and the dependent variable should not vanish.  
3- When the independent variable is controlled, the relationship between the 
antecedent variable and the dependent variable should disappear.  
 
None of these conditions were met. The correlation only existed between CEO duality 
and top management ownership, presented in Table 4 above. Furthermore, when the 
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effect of top management ownership was controlled, the relationship between CEO 
duality and corporate performance persisted (a moderate significant relationship at the 
0.10 level). The third condition was not met as there was not any relationship between 
top management ownership and corporate performance as presented in Table 4 above. 
The results of these tests confirmed that top management ownership is not an 
antecedent variable.      
 
Table 7: the partial correlation between CEO duality and corporate performance (the 
effect of top management ownership was controlled) 
Correlations 
Control 
Variables     
Return 
on 
Assets 
Return on 
Equity 
CEO 
Duality 
Correlation 1.000 0.806 -0.268 
Significance (2-tailed) . 0.000 0.099 
Return on 
Assets 
Df 0 37 37 
Correlation 0.806 1.000 -0.296 
Significance (2-tailed) 0.000 . 0.067 
Return on 
Equity 
Df 37 0 37 
Correlation -0.268 -0.296 1.000 
Significance (2-tailed) 0.099 0.067 . 
Top 
Management 
Ownership 
CEO 
Duality 
Df 37 37 0 
 
Then, we hypothesised that top management ownership may be an extraneous 
variable. A variable is considered extraneous if it is logically prior to both the 
independent and dependent variables and if it is controlled, the relationship cancels 
out. However, as explained earlier in Tables 4 above, top management ownership was 
only associated with CEO duality and was not related to ROA and ROE. In addition, 
the relationship between CEO duality and corporate performance did not disappear 
when top management ownership was controlled, as presented in Table 7 above. Thus 
we concluded that top management ownership was not an extraneous.       
 
This left us with one more possibility that top management ownership may be a 
suppressor variable. A suppressor variable is one which may intercede to cancel out, 
reduce, or conceal a true relationship between two variables. In fact, after controlling 
on top management ownership, the negative correlation between CEO duality and 
corporate performance as well as the significance level increased (compare Tables 4 
and 7 above). So the relationship between CEO duality and corporate performance 
improved when controlling the effect of top management ownership. This means that 
top management ownership was a suppressor variable.     
 
5.2.3 Hypothesis 3  
Hypothesis 3 focused on how the interaction between board size and CEO duality 
may affect corporate performance. Table 8 indicated that the interaction between 
board size and CEO duality did not affect corporate performance measured by ROA 
(p-value = 0.485) and ROE (p-value = 0.652). The correlation between CEO duality, 
board size, ROA and ROE (Table 9) showed that no significant correlation between 
board size and other variables. According to Sharma et al.’s (1981) framework, board 
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size either is a homologizer variable3 or is not a moderator variable. It seems that 
board size has the characteristics of the homologizer variable. To confirm this, we 
first divided the sample at 8 members 4into small and large boards. Then, we 
regressed corporate performance measures (ROA and ROE) on the control variable 
(board size) and CEO duality. Table 10 indicates that for large boards, CEO duality 
significantly and negatively affected ROA (p-value = 0.039) and ROE (p-value = 
0.034) and the model explained 14.3%% of the variation in ROA and 15% of the 
variation of the variation in ROE. Table 10 also indicates that for small boards, CEO 
duality positively impacted ROA and ROE and the model explained just 0.2% of the 
variation in corporate performance but the results were not significant at conventional 
levels. This resulted in concluding that sub-groups (large vs. small boards) were 
different with respect to R Square and board size was a homologizer variable.    
 
Table 8: The Results of the Third Hypothesis Test 
Dependent variable: ROA 
 Coefficient Value S.D. t-statistics p-value 
Constant  
CEO Duality 
Board Size 
CEO duality * Board Size 
A 
b1 
b2 
b3 
0.023 
0.012 
0.013 
-0.008 
0.105 
0.116 
0.010 
0.011 
0.216 
0.106 
1.215 
-0.705 
0.830 
0.916 
0.232 
0.485 
R Square = 0.123; Adjusted R Square = 0.050; F(3, 36) = 1.686; p-value = 0.187  
Dependent variable: ROE 
 Coefficient Value S.D. t-statistics p-value 
Constant  
CEO Duality 
Board Size 
CEO duality * Board Size 
A 
b1 
b2 
b3 
0.222 
-0.032 
0.010 
-0.011 
0.237 
0.262 
0.023 
0.025 
0.934 
-0.123 
0.441 
-0.455 
0.356 
0.903 
0.662 
0.652 
R Square = 0.081; Adjusted R Square = 0.004; F(3, 36) = 1.056; p-value) = 0.380 
 
Table 9: The correlation between CEO duality, board size, ROA and ROE 
Correlations 
  Return on Assets Return on Equity 
CEO 
Duality Board Size 
Pearson Correlation 1 0.805** -0.232 0.196
Sig. (2-tailed) . 0.000 0.149 0.226
Return on Assets 
N 40 40 40 40
Pearson Correlation 0.805** 1 -0.275 -0.039
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 . 0.086 0.809
Return on Equity 
N 40 40 40 40
Pearson Correlation -0.232 -0.275 1 0.172
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.149 0.086 . 0.289
CEO Duality 
N 40 40 40 40
Pearson Correlation 0.196 -0.039 0.172 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.226 0.809 0.289 . 
Board Size 
N 40 40 40 40
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
                                                 
3 Homologizer variable is a type of moderators which influences the strength of the relationship, does 
not interact with the independent variable, and is not significantly related to either the independent or 
dependent variable. In such a situation, the error term is posited to be a function of the moderator 
variable.  
4 The selection of 8 members was based on Jensen’s (1993) assumption that when a board has more 
than seven or eight directors, the board of directors is less likely to function effectively and are easier 
for the CEO to control. 
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Table 10: the relationship between CEO duality and corporate performance (the effect 
of board size was controlled) 
Board Size Large (members > 8) Small (members ≤ 8) 
Corporate performance ROA ROE ROA ROE 
Coefficient      
Value  0.200 0.411 0.073 0.210 Constant 
S.D. 0.046 0.101 0.033 0.089 
Value -0.109 -0.245 0.006 0.016 CEO duality 
S.D. 0.051 0.110 0.043 0.115 
R-Square 0.143 0.150 0.002 0.002 
Adjusted R-Square 0.112 0.120 -0.122 -0.122 
P-value 0.039 0.034 0.891 0.894 
 
5.2.3 Hypothesis 4  
In hypothesis 4, we expected that the interaction between CEO duality and 
institutional ownership may influence corporate performance. Test results (Table 11) 
indicated that the interaction between interaction between institutional ownership and 
CEO duality was not significant relative to ROA (p-value = 0.404) and ROE (p-value 
= 0.205) but the model as a whole was significant (p-value = 0.003) and explained 
31% of the variation in corporate performance. By examining the correlation between 
CEO duality, institutional ownership, ROA and ROE (Table 12), it became clear that 
institutional ownership was not a moderator variable as it had a significant positive 
correlation with both ROA and ROE. This simply suggested that institutional 
ownership was just another independent variable. By removing the interaction 
between CEO duality and institutional ownership from the regression model, the 
significance level of the model was improved (p-value = 0.001) and the model still 
explained 30% of the variation in ROA and 28% of the variation in ROE, as presented 
in Table 13. 
 
Table 11: The Results of the Fourth Hypothesis Test 
Dependent variable: ROA 
 Coefficient Value S.D. t-statistics p-value 
Constant  
CEO Duality 
Institutional Ownership 
CEO duality * Institutional 
Ownership 
A 
b1 
b2 
b3 
0.057 
-0.041 
0.236 
-0.091 
0.045 
0.055 
0.093 
0.108 
1.268 
-0.758 
2.520 
-0.844 
0.213 
0.454 
0.016 
0.404 
R Square = 0.314; Adjusted R Square = 0.257; F(3, 36) = 5.497; p-value = 0.003 
Dependent variable: ROE 
 Coefficient Value S.D. t-statistics p-value 
Constant  
CEO Duality 
Institutional Ownership 
CEO duality * Institutional 
Ownership 
A 
b1 
b2 
b3 
0.112 
-0.067 
0.569 
-0.308 
0.099 
0.121 
0.207 
0.238 
1.123 
-0.551 
2.751 
-1.291 
0.269 
0.585 
0.009 
0.205 
R Square = 0.313; Adjusted R Square = 0.256; F(3, 36) = ; p-value =0.003  
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Table 12: the correlation between CEO duality, institutional ownership, ROA and 
ROE 
Correlations 
  
Return on 
Assets 
Return on 
Equity 
CEO 
Duality 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Pearson Correlation 1 0.805** -0.232 0.443**
Sig. (2-tailed) . 0.000 0.149 0.004
Return on Assets 
N 40 40 40 40
Pearson Correlation 0.805** 1 -0.275 0.393*
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 . 0.086 0.012
Return on Equity 
N 40 40 40 40
Pearson Correlation -0.232 -0.275 1 0.191
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.149 0.086 . 0.238
CEO Duality 
N 40 40 40 40
Pearson Correlation 0.443** 0.393* 0.191 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.004 0.012 0.238 . 
Institutional 
Ownership 
N 40 40 40 40
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 13: The Results of the Fourth Hypothesis Test (without interaction) 
Dependent variable: ROA 
 Coefficient Value S.D. t-statistics p-value 
Constant  
CEO Duality 
Institutional Ownership 
A 
b1 
b2 
0.082 
-0.078 
0.167 
0.033 
0.033 
0.046 
2.461 
-2.347 
3.613 
0.019 
0.024 
0.001 
R Square = 0.301; Adjusted R Square = 0.263; F(2, 37) = 7.951; p-value = 0.001 
Dependent variable: ROE 
 Coefficient Value S.D. t-statistics p-value 
Constant  
CEO Duality 
Institutional Ownership 
A 
b1 
b2 
0.197 
-0.190 
0.337 
0.075 
0.075 
0.104 
2.632 
-2.556 
3.252 
0.012 
0.015 
0.002 
R Square = 0.281; Adjusted R Square = 0.242; F(2, 37) = 7.232; p-value = 0.002 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusions  
In this study, we investigated the predictions of agency theory with regard to the 
negative association between CEO duality and corporate performance. We 
hypothesized that board size, top managerial ownership and institutional ownership 
are moderating variables which moderate, and possibly change, the relationship 
between CEO duality and corporate performance. To accomplish this objective, we 
used the data of 40 most active non-financial Egyptian listed companies. We 
examined two accounting-based performance metrics: ROA and ROE. Sharma et al.’s 
(1981) framework was used to identify and analyse moderating variables.   
 
We predicted that CEO duality would be negatively associated with corporate 
performance because when the CEO also serves as board chairman, then board 
monitoring and control are weakened and the interests of the shareholders will be 
sacrificed to a degree in favour of executive management. Research findings suggest 
that one of the two performance metrics (ROE) moderately support this hypothesis. 
This was a preliminary finding as we expected that other corporate governance 
mechanisms may moderate, and possibly change, the relationship between CEO 
duality and corporate performance.    
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In addition, we investigated the interactive effect of top management ownership and 
CEO duality on corporate performance. We did not find a significant interaction 
between top management ownership and CEO duality for the two performance 
measures (ROA and ROE). Then, we concluded that top management ownership is 
not a moderator variable. By examining the correlation between top management 
ownership and other variables (CEO duality, ROA and ROE), we found that top 
management ownership had a significant negative relationship with CEO duality. This 
resulted in excluding the possibility that top management ownership might be another 
independent variable. We conducted a number of analyses to identify the role played 
by top management ownership into the relationship between CEO duality and 
corporate performance. As a result of these analyses, we also excluded the 
possibilities that top management ownership might be an intervening variable, an 
antecedent variable or an extraneous variable. We concluded that top management 
ownership was a suppressor variable which may intercede to cancel out, reduce, or 
conceal a true relationship between CEO duality and corporate performance and 
should be controlled.  
 
We also examined the interactive effect of board size and CEO duality on corporate 
performance. We found that no significant interaction between board size and CEO 
duality for both corporate performance measures (ROA and ROE). Furthermore, there 
was no significant correlation between board size and other variables (CEO duality, 
ROA and ROE). Additional analysis revealed that board size was a homologizer 
variable. This type of moderating variable should be controlled as it influences the 
strength of the relationship between CEO duality and corporate performance, does not 
interact with CEO duality, and is not significantly related to either CEO duality or 
corporate performance.  
 
Last not least, we investigated the impact of the interaction between institutional 
ownership and CEO duality on corporate performance. Our results indicated that the 
interaction between interaction between institutional ownership and CEO duality was 
not significant relative to corporate performance measures (ROA and ROE). The 
correlation between institutional ownership and other variables (CEO duality, ROA 
and ROE) suggested that institutional ownership was not a moderator variable but was 
just another independent variable as it had a significant positive correlation with 
corporate performance. 
 
As a result of our findings, the hypothesized relationship between the independent 
variable (CEO duality), the moderating variables (top management ownership, board 
size and institutional ownership) and the dependent variable (corporate performance) 
has changed (see Figure 3). We found that board size was the only moderating 
variable (a homologizer variable), top management ownership was a suppressor 
variable, and institutional ownership was another independent variable.  
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CEO Duality  Corporate 
Performance  
Moderating Variables 
Board Size  
Institutional 
Ownership  
Suppressor Variables 
Top Management Ownership
Figure 1: The new relationship between CEO duality, other corporate governance 
mechanisms and corporate performance. 
 
To test this new model, we controlled the effects of board size5 and top management 
ownership6 on the relationship among CEO duality, institutional ownership and 
corporate performance. The results, presented in Table 14, indicated that the new 
regression model as a whole explained 45.2% of the variation in ROA (p-value = 
0.001) and 38.6% of the variation in ROE (p-value = 0.002). R-Square improved 
sharply when comparing these results with those reported in Tables 2 and 13. So the 
new model is better in explaining the variation in corporate performance. This means 
that for companies characterized by large boards and low top management ownership, 
corporate performance is negatively affected by CEO duality and positively affected 
by institutional ownership. This conclusion is consistent with other research such as 
Daily and Dalton (1994) and Brickley et al. (1997).     
 
Table 14: The relationship among CEO duality, institutional ownership and corporate 
performance (the effects of board size and top management ownership were 
controlled) 
Dependent variable: ROA 
 Coefficient Value S.D. t-statistics p-value 
Constant  
CEO Duality 
Institutional Ownership 
A 
b1 
b2 
0.119 
-0.123 
0.197 
0.055 
0.047 
0.058 
2.191 
-2.594 
3.427 
0.038 
0.016 
0.002 
R Square = 0.452; Adjusted R Square = 0.408; F(2, 25) = 10.312; p-value = 0.001 
Dependent variable: ROE 
 Coefficient Value S.D. t-statistics p-value 
Constant  
CEO Duality 
Institutional Ownership 
A 
b1 
b2 
0.270 
-0.280 
0.365 
0.126 
0.110 
0.133 
2.143 
-2.554 
2.742 
0.042 
0.017 
0.011 
R Square = 0.386; Adjusted R Square = 0.337; F(2, 25) = 7.863; p-value = 0.002 
 
This study contributes to the literature on corporate governance and corporate 
performance (e.g. Yermack, 1996; Gompers et al., 2003; Klapper and Love, 2004; 
                                                 
5 We focused only on large boards (members > 8) as most Egyptian companies have large board sizes 
(30 out of 40 companies).   
6 We focused only on low top management ownership as mot Egyptian companies in the sample have 
low management ownership (36 out of 40 companies). In this regard, top management ownership is 
low when top management owns less than 20% of the company’s total number of shares. The selection 
of this percentage is based on the assumption that 20% or more gives the owner the ability to exercise 
significant influence over operating and financial policies of the company.  
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Bauer et al., 2008) by introducing a framework for identifying and analysing 
moderating variables that affect the relationship between CEO duality and corporate 
performance. It also highlighted the fact that the ‘new’ corporate governance 
principles that have recently been introduced to the Egyptian stock exchange market 
are still not effective as most Egyptian companies have large boards, low top 
management ownership and CEO duality.  
 
The findings of this study open new directions for future research. First, other 
corporate governance mechanisms such as independent auditors, internal auditors, 
audit committees and ownership structure may influence the relationship between 
CEO duality and corporate performance. There is great potential for future studies to 
investigate these relationships. Second, the framework for identifying and analysing 
moderating variables is a valuable tool that should be used in other corporate 
governance research as well as other accounting research. Finally, a limitation of this 
study is the use of accounting-based performance measures because of the expected 
earnings management behaviours by CEOs (Beasley, 1996; Healy and Wahlen, 1999; 
Burgstahler and Eames, 2003; Bradbury et al., 2006), taking into account the 
weaknesses in corporate governance structures in the Egyptian listed companies. 
Future research should use market-based measures or combine accounting-based 
measures with market-based measures.        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 21
7. References 
Abdullah, S. (2004), ‘Board Composition, CEO Duality and Performance among Malaysian Listed 
Companies’, Corporate Governance, 4: 47-61.  
Agrawal, A. and Chadha, S. (2005), ‘Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals’, Journal of 
Law and Economics, 48(2): 371-406. 
Balgobin, R. (2008), ‘Global Governance Practice: The Impact of Measures Taken to Restore Trust in 
Corporate Governance Practice Internationally’, Journal of Corporate Governance, 7(1): 7-21.   
Baliga, B., Moyer, C., and Rao, R. (1996), ‘CEO Duality and Firm Performance: What’s the Fuss?’, 
Strategic Management Journal, 17: 41-53. 
Barnhart, S. and Rosenstein, S. (1998), ‘Board Composition, Managerial Ownership and Firm 
Performance’, The Financial Review, 33: 1-16.  
Baron, R. and kenny, D. (1986), ‘The Moderator-Mediator Variable Distinction in Social 
Psychological Research: Conceptual, Strategic and Statistical Considerations’, Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 51(6): 1173-1182.   
Bauer, R., Frijns, B., Otten, R. and Tourani, A. (2008), ‘The Impact of Corporate Governance on 
Corporate Performance: Evidence from Japan’, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 16(3): 236-
251.  
Beasley, M. (1996), ‘An Empirical Analysis of the Relation between the Board of Director 
Composition and Financial Statement Fraud’, The Accounting Review, 71: 443-465.  
Bennedsen, M., Kongsted, H. and Nielsen, K. (2007), ‘The Causal Effect of Board Size in the 
Performance of Small and Medium-sized Firms’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 
(Forthcoming): 1-12. 
Berg, S. and Smith, S. (1978), ‘CEO and Board Chairman: A Quantitative Study of Dual vs. Unity 
Board Leadership’, Directors and Boards, 3: 34-39.   
Boyd, B. (1995), ‘CEO Duality and Firm Performance: A Contingency Model’, Strategic 
Management Journal, 16: 301-312.  
Bradbury, M., Mak, Y. and Tan, S. (2006), ‘Board Characteristics, Audit Committee Characteristics 
and Abnormal Accruals’, Pacific Accounting Review, 18(2): 47-68.  
Brickley, J., Coles, J. and Jarrell, G. (1997), ‘Leadership Structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman 
of the Board’, Journal of Corporate Finance, 3: 189 – 220.  
Brickley, J., Coles, J., and Terry, R. (1994), ‘Outside Directors and the Adoption of Poison Pills’, 
Journal of Financial Economics, 35: 371-390. 
Burgstahler, D. and Eames, M. (2003), ‘Earning Management to Avoid Earnings Decreases and 
Losses’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 24: 99-126.  
Burns, T. (2001), ‘Implications of Information Technology on Corporate Governance’, International 
Journal of Law and Information Technology, 9(1): 21-38. 
Chaganti, R. and Damanpour, F. (1991), ‘Institutional Ownership, Capital Structure and Firm 
Performance’, Strategic Management Journal, 12: 479- 491.    
Chaganti, S., Mahajan, V. and Sharma, S. (1985), ‘Corporate Board Size, Composition and Corporate 
Failure in Retailing Industry’, Journal of Management Studies, 22: 400-417.  
Cheng, S. (2008), ‘Board Size and the Variability of Corporate Performance’, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 87: 157-176.  
Chung, M., Michael, F. and Jeong-Bon, K. (2002), ‘Institutional Monitoring and Opportunistic 
Earning Management’, Journal of Corporate Finance, 8(1): 33-45.  
Clarke, T. (2004), ‘Theories of Corporate Governance: the Philosophical Foundations of Corporate 
Governance’, London: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group.  
Coles, J., McWilliams, V. and Sen, N. (2001), ‘An Examination of the Relationship of Governance 
Mechanisms to Performance’, Journal of Management, 27(1): 23-55.  
Cross, S. (2004), ‘Corporate Governance, Information Technology and the Electronic Company in the 
United Kingdom’, Information and Communication Technology Law, 13(2): 117-128. 
Daily, C. and Dalton, D. (1992), ‘The Relationship between Governance Structure and Corporate 
Performance in Entrepreneurial Firms’, Journal of Business Venturing, 7(5): 375-386. 
Daily, C.M., Dalton, D.R. (1994), ‘Bankruptcy and Corporate Governance: the Impact of Board 
Composition and Structure", Academy of Management Journal,  37: 1603-1617.  
 22
Dalton, D. and Kesner, I. (1987), ‘Composition and CEO Duality in Boards of Directors: An 
International Perspective’, Journal of International Business Studies, 28: 33-42.   
Davidson, R., Stewart, T. and Kent, P. (2005), ‘Internal Governance Structures and Earnings 
Management’, Accounting and Finance, 45: 241-247.   
Davis, G. (1991), ‘Agents without Principles? The Spread of the Poison Pill Through the Inter-
corporate Network’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 36: 583-613.  
Dayton, N. (1984), ‘Corporate Governance: the Other Side of the Coin’, Harvard Business Review, 
62: 34-37.  
Donaldson, L. and Davis, J. (1991), ‘Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO Governance and 
Shareholder Returns’, Australian Journal of Management, 16: 49-64. 
Dunk, A. (1993), ‘The Effect of Budget Emphasis and Information Asymmetry on the Relation 
between Budgetary Participation and Slack’, The Accounting Review, 68(2): 400-410. 
Eighme, J. and Cashell, J. (2002), ‘Internal Auditors’ Roles in Overcoming the Financial Reporting 
Crisis’, International Auditing, 17: 3-10.   
Eisenberg, T., Sundgren, S., Wells, M. (1998), ‘Larger Board Size and Decreasing Firm Value in 
Small Firms’, Journal of Financial Economics, 48: 113-139.   
Eisenhardt, K. (1989), ‘Making Fast Strategic Decisions in High-Velocity Environments’, Academy of 
Management Journal, 32: 543-576.  
Erhardt, N., Werbel, J., and Shrader, C. (2003), ‘Board of Directors Diversity and Firm Financial 
Performance’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 11: 102 – 111. 
Fama, E. and Jensen, C. (1983), ‘Separation of Ownership and Control’, Journal of Law Economics, 
26:301-325. 
Finkelstein, S. and D’Aveni, R. (1994), ‘CEO Duality as a Double-Edged Sword: How Boards of 
Directors Balance Entrenchment Avoidance and Unity of Command’, Academy of 
Management Journal, 37: 1079 – 1108. 
Gompers, P., Ishii, J. and Metrick, A. (2003), ‘Corporate Governance and Euity Prices’, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 118(February): 107-155. 
Hartmann, F. and Moers, F. (1999), ‘Testing Contingency Hypotheses in Budgetary Research: An 
Evaluation of the Use of Moderated Regression Analysis’, Accounting, Organisations and 
Society, 24(4): 291-315. 
Healy, P. and Wahlen, J. (1999), ‘A Review of the Earning Management Literature and its 
Implications for Standard Setting’, Accounting Horizons, 13(4): 365-383.  
Hermalin, B. and Weisbach, M. (2003), ‘Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined 
Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature’, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Policy 
Review, 9: 7-26.   
Jensen, M. (1993), ‘The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit and the Failure of Internal Control 
Systems’, Journal of Finance, 48 (July): 831-329. 
Jensen, M. and Meckling, W. (1976), ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure’, Journal of Financial Economics, 3: 305-360.  
Kesner, I. and Dalton, D. (1986), ‘Boards of Directors and The Checks and (Im)balances of Corporate 
Governance’, Business Horizons, 29(5): 17-23. 
Klapper, L. and Love, I. (2004), ‘Corporate Governance, Investor Protection, and Performance in 
Emerging Markets’, Journal of Corporate Finance, 10: 703-728.  
Klein, A. (2002), ‘Audit Committee, Board of Director Characteristics, and Earnings Management’, 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33 (August): 375-400.  
Levy, L. (1981), ‘Reforming Board Reform’, Harvard Business Review, 59: 166-172.  
Lin, Y. (2005), ‘Corporate Governance, Leadership Structure and CEO Composition: Evidence from 
Taiwan’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13: 824-835.  
Lipton, M. and Lorsch, J. (1992), ‘A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance’, Business 
Lawyer, 59 (November): 59-77.  
Mallin, C. (2002), ‘Corporate Governance, Institutional Investors and Socially Responsible 
Investment’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 10: 1-3.   
Mallin, C. (2007), ‘Corporate Governance - 2nd Edition’, New York: Oxford University Press.  
 23
McCarthy, D. and Puffer, S. (2008), ‘Interpreting the Ethicality of Corporate Governance Decisions in 
Russia: Utilising Integrative Social Contracts Theory to Evaluate the Relevance of Agency 
Theory Norms’, Academy of Management Review, 33(1): 22-31. 
Molz, R. (1988), ‘Managerial Domination of Boards of Directors and Financial Performance’, 
Journal of Business Research, 16: 235-249.  
Morck, R., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1988), ‘Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An 
Empirical Analysis’, Journal of Financial Economics, 20 (March): 293-315. 
Muth, M. and Donaldson, L. (1998), ‘Stewardship Theory and Board Structure: A Contingency 
Approach’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 6: 5-28. 
Omran, M., Bolbol, A. and Fatheldin, A. (2008), ‘Corporate Governance and Firm Performance in 
Arab Equity Markets: Does Ownership Concentration Matter?’, International Review of Law 
and Economics, 28(1): 32-45.   
Parker, L. (2005), ‘Corporate Governance Crisis Down Under: Post-Enron Accounting Education and 
Research Inertia’, European Accounting Review, 14(2): 383-394. 
Phan, P. and Yoshikawa, T. (2000), ‘Agency Theory and Japanese Corporate Governance’, Asia 
Pacific Journal of Management, 17(1): 1-27.   
Pi, L. and Timme, S. (1993), ‘Corporate Control and Bank Efficiency’, Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 17: 515-530.  
Rechner, L. and Dalton, D. (1991), ‘CEO Duality and Organizational Performance: A Longitudinal 
Analysis’, Strategic Management Journal, 12: 155-160. 
Rhoades, D., Rechner, P. and Sundaramurthy, C. (2001), ‘A Meta-analysis of Board Leadership 
Structure and Financial Performance: Are “two heads better than one” ?’, Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 9: 311-319.   
Rosenberg, M. (1968), ‘The Logic of Survey Analysis’, New York: Basic Books, Inc. 
Russell, C. and Babko, P. (1992), ‘Moderated Regression Analysis and Likert Scales: Too Coarse for 
Comfort ’, Journal of Applied Psychology, 77(3): 336-342. 
Salancik, C. and Pfeffer, J. (1980), ‘Effects of Ownership and Performance on Executive Tenure in 
US Corporations’, Academy of Management Journal, 23: 635-664. 
Seal, W. (2006), ‘Management Accounting and Corporate Governance: An Institutional Interpretation 
of the Agency Problem’, Management Accounting Research, 17(4): 389-408.  
Sharma, S., Durand, R. and Gur-Arie, O. (1981), ‘Identification and Analysis of Moderator 
Variables’, Journal of Marketing Research, 18(3): 291-300.  
Smith, M. (2003), ‘Research Methods in Accounting’, London: SAGE Publications.  
Tipgos, M. and Keefe, T. (2004), ‘A Comprehensive Structure of Corporate Governance in Post-
Enron-Corporate America’, CPA Journal, 74 (12): 46-51. 
Yermack, D. (1996), ‘Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of Directors’, 
Journal of Financial Economics, 40 (February): 185 – 212.   
 
 
 
 
 
 24
